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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State 
Road Commission to acquire certain real property along 
5300 South Street in Salt Lake County for the purpose 
of constructing an expressway thereon. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before a jury, Judge Joseph 
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G. Jeppson, presiding. The state appeals from the Judg-
ment on the Verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant State, seeks reversal of the Judg-
ment on the Verdict of the lower court together with an 
order that the case be remanded for a new trial. » , 
| STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By this action the Utah State Road Commission 
sought to acquire property to widen 5300 South Street 
in Salt Lake County in order to build an expressway west 
from the 1-15 freeway. 
The subject tract was improved with a store built 
by the owner Mr. Brown which was leased together with 
about one fourth of the total tract to the tenant South-
land Corporation (7-11 Stores). The state acquired ap-
proximately 0.4 of an acre in fee and easements in a strip 
from the front portion of the tract in order to widen 5300 
South. I t also limited the access to 5300 South to two 
designated openings. While the store building itself was 
not taken both the owner's and state's appraisers assessed 
severance damages due to the taking. 
At the trial Mr. Charles Saxton, fee appraiser for the 
owner defendant Brown, gave his opinion of just compen-
sation. His opinion, was based on the fair market value of 
land and improvements with the present value of the 
tenant's lease added over and above which substantially 
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enhanced and increased the total value of the premises 
over the uencumbered fee value in Mr. Saxton's mind. 
Mr. Edward Pack, witness for Southland Corporation 
(7-11) testified as to the original cost, depreciated value 
and present worth of certain equipment which included 
personal property. Mr. Pack also testified as to the ren-
tal income from various 7-11 Stores as well as the particu-
lar store in question. 
Mr. Jerry Webber, fee appraiser, testified for South-
land Corporation (7-11) as to value of the lease hold in-
terest based solely on information supplied by 7-11 stores. 
While he offered no evidence at all as to market value 
of the subject property, Mr. Webber was willing to testify 
to three separate figures for present value of the lease 
interest. He then clarified that in his opinion two of 
those figures were wrong. 
The state submits that defendants' method of ap-
praisal together with testimony of the value of the lease 
interest totally separate and apart from fair market 
value of the property resulted in a verdict contrary to 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVI-
DENCE OF VALUATION OF A LEASEHOLD 
INTEREST TO BE ADDED OVER AND 
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ABOVE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Mr. Charles Saxton testified for the landowner, de-
fendant Brown as to the market value of the subject prop-
erty which was encumbered by a lease to the tenant de-
fendant Southland Corporation for their 7-11 store. While 
several items of evidence were elicited from Mr. Saxton 
during cross examination which were clearly incompetent, 
the court chose to deny the state's motion to strike his 
testimony (T. 88). 
The most glaring error complained of in this appeal 
is that Mr. Saxton was obviously allowed to tack on the 
value of the leasehold interest over and above his own 
opinion of fair market value of the subject property. Mr. 
Saxton first testified that the fair market value of the 
land was $1.25 per square foot (T. 67, 93, 94). At page 
67 of the transcript is the following testimony: 
"A. I took into consideration first what the 
property indicated the value was per square foot 
of the property. 
Q. And what was that? 
A. The land, a $1.25. 
Q. OK, now that would be raw land with-
out a lease. 
A. Yes sir." 
Then for the value of the lease-hold interest Mr. 
Saxton calculated separate and apart what a purchaser 
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would pay for the land under lease. The result is an in-
crease of 11 cents to a $1.36 per square foot (T. 70). 
Clearly Mr. Saxton estimated a fair market value of the 
land then added an increment for the lease of 11 cents 
over and above the fair market value for each of the 
66,864.6 square feet in the total tract of subject property 
(T. 68), even though only one fourth of the total tract or 
about 16,000 square feet was actually leased (T. 155). 
Similarly, according to Mr. Saxton the value of the build-
ing on the property was worth $33,584.82 without a lease, 
but with a lease the building became worth $64,709.54 
(T. 70). 
The result is that Mr. Saxton estimates the total 
value of the unencumbered subject property before the 
taking at "around $90,000" but the value of the same 
property with the lease is estimated at over $156,000 
(T. 109, 110). Mr. Saxton has apparently coined an un-
precedented recipe for instant wealth: Take fee prop-
erty, add a lease, and presto! The market value has in-
creased over 75%. It is doubtful that such financial magic 
is so effective other than in a condemnation action. While 
it is proper to solve the condemnation problem with a 
lease clause between the owner and his tenant, Mr. Sax-
ton's procedure is faulty because it allows the parties to 
establish their own fair market value merely by manipu-
lating the terms of the lease as to rent paid and period 
of the lease. 
The implication of this method is as obvious as the 
method is inaccurate. I t is erroneous to calculate the fair 
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market value of the property and then add thereto the 
separated value of the leasehold interest in order to 
arrive at a total "before value" of the property. Rather* 
the correct method of valuation is to find the fair market 
value of the whole tract upon a sale to a buyer knowledge-
able in the market place, then determine the amount of 
just compensation and apportion that award between 
the owner and the tenant. The law is clear as to the 
method of determining the value of the property when 
an owner and a tenant are involved. A leading authority 
on eminent domain matters states the law in these terms: 
In the valuation process, a property is ap-
praised as if it were not subject to various own-
,>fi ership interests; the fact that it may be subject 
to leasehold interests is ignored. The justifi-
cation for this view is that what is being taken 
is the property as a whole, not the sum of the 
separate interests in it. Parties cannot claim 
that their interests are worth more when valued 
separately and demand further compensation. 
This policy creates a defined, limited fund 
out of which all those with an interest in the 
property must be paid. Once this is done a con-
demnor steps out of the picture and the inter-
ested parties must compete for as large a share 
of the available award they can get. Given the 
limited nature of the fund it is obvious that the 
more any one party gets, the less there is to be 
distributed among the other claimants. Nichols 
on Eminent Domain, § 11.01. CrCt- 7 , pu~4 
Other authorities concur that the law does not per-
mit valuation by the sum of the interests involved. 
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When there are different interests or estates 
in the property, the proper course is to ascertain 
the entire compensation as though the property 
belonged to one person and then apportion this 
sum among the different parties according to 
their respective rights. The value of property 
cannot be enhanced by any contract arrange-
ments among the owners of different interests. 
Whatever advantage is secured to one interest 
must be taken from another and the sum of the 
parts cannot exceed the whole. J. Lewis, Emi-
nent Domain § 716 (3rd Edition) as quoted in 
Rams, Valuation for Eminent Domain, 1973, p. 
256. 
Where leased property is taken by eminent 
domain, it is ordinarily valued as though held 
in a single ownership rather than by separately 
evaluating the interest of the lessor and lessee, 
and the compensation for the property taken or 
injured is then apportioned between the lessor 
and lessee according to their respective interests 
. . . As in the case of apportionment of awards 
generally . . . the condemnor ordinarily has no 
interest in the apportionment of the award be-
tween the lessor and the lessee. 29A, C. J. S. 
Eminent Domain § 198. 
While Utah law has no case directly in point on 
this matter the Utah Supreme Court has expressed its 
concurrence with the general law as set forth above. In 
referring to the awarding of damages to the tenant the 
Supreme Court said: 
"Whatever damage he sustained should have 
been deducted from the total value of the land 
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taken and the severance damages sustained. The 
rules regarding the respective interests of lessees 
and lessors are set out in 29A C. J. S. Eminent 
Domain § 198." Ogden City v. Stephens, 445 
P. 2d 703, 21 Utah 2d 336. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado has approved the 
same procedure for apportionment of an award between 
landlord and tenant. 
The Supreme Court held that the state was 
entitled to acquire the entire property upon pay-
ment of the reasonable market value of the real 
estate plus damages to the residue at the time of 
the taking. This market value is to be ascer-
tained in a gross amount which will thereafter 
be apportioned between the lessor and the lessee 
in accordance with their respective interests. 
City of Sterling v. Plains Investment Company, 
511 P. 2d 512 (Colo. 1973). 
Another Colorado case clarifies the law on this issue. 
In quoting from a Missouri Supreme Court decision the 
Colorado Court quoted with approval as follows: 
. . . the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected 
the argument made by a lessee of real estate 
which was being taken for public use that he was 
entitled to a separate assessment of damages 
on account of the loss of his leasehold interest. 
The Missouri court held that the proper course 
was to ascertain the entire compensation as 
though the property belonged to one person and 
then to apportion this sum among the persons 
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having rights therein as their respective inter-
ests appeared. 
* * * 
Once the reasonable market value of prop-
erty subject to eminent domain proceedings has 
been established, the apportionment of that 
amount among persons claiming an interest there-
in is a matter of no concern to the condemnor. 
Vivian v. Board of Trustees of Colo. School of 
Mines, 383 P. 2d 801 (Colo. 1963). 
The law of the State of New York also holds that 
the proper method is to first ascertain the award based 
on the property as if it were unencumbered and then to 
apportion that amount among all the interests which are 
held in the property. 
Generally speaking, where there are two or 
more interests or estates in a condemned parcel 
the proper mode of assessing damage is to ascer-
tain first the damage to the fee as if it were un-
encumbered, and then to apportion that amount 
among all of the estates and interests which are 
held in the property. Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Company v. State, 238 N. E. 2d 705 (N. Y. 
1968). 
Thus, it can be seen from the law as quoted above 
that the correct procedure for the court to use is to base 
the award on the value of the tract of property as owned 
by a single person unencumbered and as the value is set 
by a market transaction to a willing buyer. Subsequently, 
the court must determine the apportionment of that 
award between the interested parties. This procedure 
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was clearly not followed in this case and therefore the 
verdict should be reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions to follow the law. 
The instructions Nos. 12, 16, 16B and 17 were de-
livered by the court to the jury (R. 413 thru 428). They 
were objected to by counsel for the State (T. 388 thru 
390). They are an erroneous statement of the law and 
only served to confuse the jury. The instructions caused 
the jury to separately assess the damages caused to the 
owners and lessee as well as to assess the effect of the 
lease on the market value of the property. Moreover, 
Instruction No. 24 requires the jury to base their con-
clusion of Just Compensation on "what defendants have 
lost" (R. 428). Clearly the correct measure of value is 
what a willing buyer would pay for the property, not 
whatever loss may be peculiar to these particular defen-
dants. To the contrary the court refused the state's 
proffered Instruction No. 37 (R. 500) which the state 
feels is a more correct definition of the law as set forth 
above. • 
Thus, it is clear that the testimony before the jury 
together with the instructions by the court confused the 
jury and in effect compelled them to apply an incorrect 
method of arriving at the value of the subject property 
by adding the interests of the various parties involved. 
All witnesses testified that the owner was receiving 
less rental per month on his contract than similar prop-
erties were renting for in the market. Thus, this particu-
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lar lease was one favorable to the tenant Southland Cor-
poration, but unfavorable to the owner since he could 
have leased his unencumbered property for more in the 
market. Mr. Saxton testified that in his experience, 
. . . men will pay more, much more, for a piece 
of property which has a long-term lease on it 
by a reputable company which is obligated to 
pay that lease over that period of time, than what 
lie would for just the land and the building. 
There is a value to the lease there (T. 107). 
Mr. Saxton's testimony is thus tantamount to claim-
ing that a buyer of the whole tract under lease would pay 
a lease enhanced value of $156,000 in order to have the 
privilege of having a steady income even though thait 
income is much less than the market would provide if 
the same buyer bought similar but unencumbered prop-
erty for $90,000 and leased it in the market for the higher 
rental figure. Such a rationale could only be possible when 
the contract rental income is higher than market rental 
so the buyer would purchase a lease favorable to the 
owner. A prudent investor simply will not invest more 
for a guarantee to receive less. 
Contrary to his own rationale, Mr. Saxton had to 
admit that where the lease is unfavorable to the owner 
(a lease at less than market ffintal)a willing buyer would 
pay less for the leased property than for the unencum-
bered property because he can lease the unencumbered 
property for more in the market (T. 115, 116). Mr. 
Webber, a witness for tenant Southland Corporation 
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(7-11) also admitted that upon the sale of two similar 
properties the one unencumbered, the other encumbered 
by a lease unfavorable to the owner, a prudent and 
knowledgeable buyer would choose the unencumbered 
property because he could lease it immediately for the 
higher market rent (T. 229), 
On the other hand, the witness for the state appraised 
the property from the standpoint of the rental value of 
the whole tract in the market. Mr. Ray Williams, expert 
witness for the State testified that since his appraisal was 
based on market and not contract rent all interests were 
represented and compensated for in his opinion of market 
value (T. 326). 
When state's counsel attempted to inquire as to the 
propriety in good appraisal practice of assigning separate 
values to different interests, the court summarily dis-
missed the question as asking for a legal conclusion. The 
court was wrong — an expert appraiser should be able 
to testify relative to good appraisal techniques (T. 327). 
The point is that a lease bringing in less than the 
market rental is not attractive to a buyer, does not en-
hance the value of the subject property and in no way 
is it a benefit for which a prudent person would pay a 
premium over and above the unencumbered fee value. 
Mr. Saxton's testimony was an incorrect application of 
appraisal theory, it confused the jury and the verdict 
must therefore be reversed. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED 
TESTIMONY FROM THE TENANT SOUTH-
LAND CORPORATION (7-11) AS TO THE 
VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD INTEREST 
SEPARATE AND APART FROM ANY TO-
TAL VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY. 
Defendant Brown purchased the property and con-
structed thereon a building in accordance with the stan-
dards of Southland Corporation for the operation of a 
7-11 store (T. 148). He subsequently leased to Southland 
Corporation the building and about one-fourth of the 
subject property (T. 155). All witnesses agreed that the 
lease rental at about $400 per month was less than the 
market value of similar property at about $500 per month. 
Mr. Pack, zone manager for the Southland Corpora-
tion (7-11) was allowed to testify over the states con-
tinuing objection as to a lease and business operation (T. 
161, 162), in August of 1973 (T. 172, 173), with complete 
disregard to the total value of the subject property or 
the correct date of valuation. In fact, Mr. Pack had never 
even estimated value of the subject property (T. 178) be-
cause his figures were for the lease alone and all testimony 
was directed at 'today's" values. He had never formed 
an opinion as of the correct valuation date (T. 184). 
Also over continued objection and proffer of proof 
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by the state Mr. Jerry Weber was allowed to testify for 
the tenant Southland Corporation (7-11) as to the value 
of the lease entirely separate and apart from the market 
value of the subject property (T. 191, 200, 224). The 
state submits that with the other testimony from the 
owner and together with the court's instructions the jury 
was confused and in order to compensate the tenant for 
his interests the jury was compelled to add the lease 
value over and above the fair market value of the prop-
erty. Such procedure is error. 
While it is entirely proper that the landowner and 
tenant should be compensated for their interest in the 
subject property, the law does not allow the total of that 
compensation to exceed the value of the subject property 
in its status of unencumbered fee owned by a single in-
dividual: 
"There is only one proceeding to deterrnine 
the value of the property taken and the damages 
to the residue. The court did not in any manner 
deprive [defendant] of its rights to present any 
evidence that it had as to the value of the fee 
and damage to the residue. The court did re-
fuse to allow (defendant] to present evidence 
bearing only upon the value of the leasehold. 
This evidence may be presented by [defendant] 
at a subsequent hearing at which [delendant] 
can present any relevant and material evidence 
it might have as to the value of the leasehold." 
City of Sterling v. Plains Investment Company, 
511 P. 2d 512 (Colorado 1973). 
Utah law reveals no case in point; nevertheless, this 
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court has expressed an indication of its concurrence with 
the above statement of the law: 
"However, whatever damage [defendantJ 
sustains should have been deducted from the 
total value of the land taken and the severance 
damages sustained. The rules regarding the re-
spective interests of lessees and lessors are set 
out in 29A C. J. S. Eminent Domain, § 198, 
Ogden City v. Stephens, 445 P. 2d 703, 21 Utah 
2d 336." 
Thus, the Utah Court has indicated that the proper 
rule to follow should be according to the general rule of 
law as set forth below: 
"Where lease property is taken by Eminent 
Domain it is ordinarily valued as though held 
in a single ownership rather than by separately 
valuing the interests of the lessor and lessee, and 
the compensation for the property taken or in-
jured is then apportioned between the lessor 
and lessee according to their respective inter-
ests. 
As in a case of apportionment of awards gen-
erally . . . the condemnor ordinarily has no in-
terest in the apportionment of the award between 
the lessor and lessee." 29A C. J. S. Eminent Do-
main § 198. 
While it might be contended that a leasehold interest 
under certain special conditions enhances the value of 
the total tract beyond its unencumbered fee value such 
a lease would necessarily be one favorable to the owner 
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and thus attractive to a prospective buyer who would 
take the owner's place, but not a lease as in the instant 
case which is favorable only to the tenant and therefore 
unattractive to a prospective buyer who for his money 
can get a higher return from similar but unencumbered 
property in the market. 
Moreover, Mr. Weber's testimony is somewhat con-
fusing to the jury. He testified that his opinion of the 
market value of the lease was $16,867 (T. 200). Yet he 
testified to another value of the lease based on Mr. Pack's 
testimony as being $44,645.56 (T. 201), and yet another 
value of $38,112.06 if based on a different "assumed rent 
differential" (T. 201, 203). However, Mr. Weber then 
proceeded to testify that he didn't agree with the latter 
figures, that he was just asked to compute it and that in 
his opinion he thought "it was wrong" (T. 225). Thus, 
Mr. Weber was allowed to base his "expert" opinion on 
the facts presented by Mr. Pack who in turn based has 
information on the figures from computer lists, and then 
to present three different values to the jury. His testi-
mony is an excellent example of the difficulty in allowing 
apportionment of award to become involved in the initial 
condemnation trial. 
Another problem with Mr. Weber's testimony is that 
he failed to recognize the valuation date as set by law, 
December 22,1971 and arbitrarily chose the date of Aug-
ust 8, 1973 (T. 220, 225) which is irrelevant and by his 
own testimony necessitates an adjustment in his values 
by more than 20% to conform to the correct date (T. 
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235). Moreover, Mr. Weber's testimony was not inde-
pendent since his father did 50% of the work and signed 
the report (T. 218), and since the report was based not 
on an independent investigation but solely on informa-
tion, facts and figures furnished by defendant Southland 
Corporation (7-11) (T. 221). 
The state submits that the testimony of Mr. P&ck 
and Mr. Weber only served to confuse the jury by plac-
ing before them three or more different figures for the 
value of the lease, together with testimony that at least 
some of those figures were wrong, thus causing the jury 
to speculate as to the different interests of owner and 
tenant. The state submits that such testimony is unpro-
fessional and incompetent and was elicited only in an 
attempt to make the lower figures look more appealing 
to the jury. The verdict being based on such evidence 
should be reversed and the case remanded for another 
trial controlled by the correct principels of law. Instruc-
tions should also be given to first determine just com-
pensation between owner and tenant and then subse-
quently apportion that award by agreement or by the 
court without involvement of the condemnor. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE 
OF THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AS 
TO THE LAW AND CONFUSION OF EVI-
DENCE AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE 
REVERSED. 
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Mr. Saxton's testimony as to severance damage was 
the highest figure presented at trial: $45,111.51 (T. 83, 
84). However, the jury returned a verdict of $53,378.00 
for severance damages (T. 392, R. 397), a figure substan-
tially in excess of any severance damage testimony at 
trial. Such excessive testimony is contrary to law and 
must be reversed. 
The law as to severance damage clearly says that 
a verdict cannot stand when it is 
. . . clearly and palpably, or flagrantly, against 
the weight of the evidence; or . . . it appears that 
the jury have committed gross and palpable 
error or have acted under improper bias, influ-
ence, or prejudice, or have mistaken the rules of 
law stating the measure of damages, or have 
rendered a verdict so excessive as to shock the 
enlightened conscience of the court. 27 Am. 
Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, § 471. 
The controlling case in Utah is State v. Silliman, 22 
Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347. In Silliman the verdict as to 
severance damages to the remainder was higher than the 
testimony at trial. On appeal that verdict was reversed 
and the case remanded because the verdict was excessive. 
In Silliman this court said: 
"The trial judge realized that the amount 
of severance damages awarded exceeded the high-
est figure of any witness, so he reduced the figure 
to $12,487.50, the amount testified to by all 
three witnesses for the landowner. Even after 
this reduction the severance damages to the 
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grazing land not taken amounted to $32.00 per 
acre which is $3.00 per acre more than the jury 
had fixed as the value of the better land taken. 
* * * 
;ii: The instant case is a good illustration that 
the verdict cannot stand when it clearly shows 
that it was given either under the influence of 
passion and prejudice or under a lack of un-
derstanding of the law as it applies to severance 
damages. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not 
granting a new trial. The judgment of the trial 
court is reversed, the verdict of the jury is set 
aside and the case is remanded for new trial." 
State v. Silliman, supra. 
In Silliman the severance damage per acre exceeded 
the land value per acre awarded and the case was reversed. 
In the instant case severance damage award exceeded 
any testimony at trial by almost 20%. The state submits 
that as in Silliman the instant case is a good illustration 
that a verdict cannot stand when given under a lack of 
understanding of law applicable to severance damages. 
In this case the excessive verdict can only be the 
result of confusion and lack of understanding of the law. 
In a condemnation trial the only proper issue before the 
jury is that of just compensation to the landowner which 
consists of the fair market value of the land and improve-
ments and any severance damages to the remainder. Al-
lowing the landowner and tenant to fight over the value 
of separate interests and whether to deduct or add those 
interests to fair market value only serves to introduce 
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extraneous, irrelevant and incompetent material which 
should properly be a subject of a separate and subse-
quent hearing. 
The erroneous instructions helped to confuse the 
jury as to the law. The court rejected the state's prof-
fered instruction (T. 387, R. 500) and instead gave in-
structions No. 12 (R. 413), No. 16 (R. 417), No, 16B 
(R, 419) and No. 17 (R. 420) to which the state took 
exception (T. 389). When taken together with the evi-
dence allowed at trial these instructions clearly called for 
the different interests to be valued separately and then 
added together in order to arrive at the fair market value 
of the subject property. That counsel for the defendant 
landowner also misunderstood the law is shown in his 
closing argument: 
I t is now my privilege to spend the next few 
minutes indicating to you why I feel that your 
award should be in the sum of the total amount 
that Mr. Brown has been damaged and the total 
amount that 7-11 Stores have been damaged by 
reason of this highway department taking here. 
* * * 
. . . as we analyze these instructions your work 
is not that hard because what the court has in 
effect told you in the instructions is that both 
Mr. and Mrs. Brown here and 7-11 Stores have 
some interest in that property at the time they 
condemned it, and if you add these two interests 
together in effect you will arrive at the fair mar-
ket value of the property interests that were 
taken (T. 339, 340). 
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Counsel clearly indicates his understanding (or mis-
understanding) that fair market value is arrived at by a 
sum of the separate interests involved. This method is 
contrary to law.) But the most significant factor recog-
nized is that in this hearing the jury was so confused by 
evidence from both landowner and tenant together with 
erroneous instructions that the verdict actually resulted 
in $53,378 damage figure while the highest testimony on 
that item was $45,111.51. The true limit on severance 
damage should be even lower because Mr. Saxton as-
sumed that the lease ran to every square foot of the sub-
ject property when actually only about one-fourth of the 
property was leased (T. 155). His figure for severance 
damage would have been smaller had he been thorough 
in his appraisal and aware of the actual size of the leased 
area (T. 119). For this reason alone the jury verdict 
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial be-
fore a jury which has a correct understanding of the appli-
cation of law regarding severance damages. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVI-
DENCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BE-
FORE THE JURY AND INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY TO DETERMINE ITS VALUE. 
Mr. Pack was Zone Manager of 7-11 Stores for the 
defendant Southland Corporation. Mr. Pack had no 
information to offer regarding the value of the subject 
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property itself and therefore should not have been al-
lowed to even testify in this hearing. His testimony prop-
erly would have been the subject of a separate and sub-
sequent hearing to divide the award between the land-
owner and the tenant. 
Nevertheless, over the state's numerous and contin-
uing objections (T. 160 to 163) Mr. Pack was allowed 
to testify as to business operations (T. 161), as to equip-
ment without knowing the difference between fixtures 
and personal property (T. 168, 181), as to equipment 
value taken from computer listings of prices (T. 170), 
with all his testimony directed to the date of termination 
of operation in August 1973 (T. 172, 173), not the cor-
rect date of valuation on December 22,1971. 
The state submits that the admission of the above 
testimony was error. Business operations, profit and 
losses per se are not properly part of an eminent domain 
action. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, 285, 29A C. J, 
S., Eminent Domain, 162. The valuation date is set by 
law at the date of service of summons, 78-34-11 Utah 
Code Annotated, and testimony not directed to that date 
is incompetent and without foundation. 
But the most serious error complained of here is 
that of allowing testimony of personal property before 
the jury. Over the state's objection (T. 166 to 169) Mr. 
Pack was allowed to testify to equipment. He could not 
say whether the equipment was fixtures, personal prop-
erty or a combination: "I don't know whether you call 
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it personal or what" (T. 168). He also testified to var-
ious irrelevant and incompetent values, $17,254.31 (T. 
170), $8,230.00 (T. 171), $4,100.00 (T. 173), $2,000 and 
$1,000 (T. 174). Which of the five different figures was 
his final value was never established, yet the court not 
only allowed the testimony but instructed that the jury 
could find damage to the personalty in Instruction 17-A: 
"in addition you may award damages to the Southland 
Corporation (7-11 Stores) for personal property . . ." 
Moreover the jury was required to find a value for per-
sonalty on the "supplemental verdict" form (R 399). 
The supplemental verdict form clearly shows that 
the jury found the value of the personal property to be 
$1400 and that the verdict for property attached to the 
building was $1200 (R. 399, T. 393); even Mr. Pack testi-
fied that only $1,000 of equipment was attached to the 
building (T. 174). 
On the other hand the court rejected the state's 
proffered Instruction No. 36 which is an accurate state-
ment of the law as follows: 
INSTRUCTION No. 36 
The law providing for the taking of prop-
erty by eminent domain and the awarding of 
damages therefor speaks in term of real prop-
erty and the damages to be awarded for its 
taking. The condemnor acquires no interest in 
the personalty; therefore, the obligation of the 
state is limited to the payment of fair value of 
the land taken plus resulting damages to the 
remainder; the value or cost of removal of per-
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* sonal property is not an item of damages to be 
separately valuated and paid for. The fact that 
defendants had personal property on the prem-
ises of whatever nature and amount is merely an 
incidental fact which they must reckon with and 
take care of their interests therein (R. 499), 
Legitimate fixtures are properly valued as part of the 
real estate only when they enhance the value of improve-
ments and not separately. State v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 
2d 153, 427 P. 2d 749. But to allow a direct valuation of 
personal property in a condemnation action is error. Utah 
Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 
917, The State never alleged the taking of personal prop-
erty and such property is not correctly before the court 
in an action to acquire real estate. In fact the condemna-
tion statute 78-34-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated does 
not even contemplate or authorize the taking of person-
alty. 
An Alabama case involving a similar store and equip-
ment reversed a lower court decision which had allowed 
evidence of personal property. The law is well expressed 
as follows: 
The trial court erred in failing to sustain 
objections to the questions relating to personal 
property in the store building. * * * The 
basic constitutional principle is that there must 
be an actual taking of property or property rights 
before compensation is required. * * * There 
is, in this state, no constitutional provision or 
statute requiring compensation for damages of 
personal property in a condemnation of realty. 
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* * * There was no attempt or application 
to condemn any personal property. The order 
of condemnation did not include any personal 
property. 
No section of our State Constitution and 
no statutes authorizes payments for personal 
property located in a building which is condemned 
for state highway purposes. 
"No allowance can be made for personal 
property, as distinguished from improvements 
or fixtures located on the condemned premises." 
29A C. J. S. Eminent Domain, § 175 (1), Page 
740. "A taking by eminent domain does not in-
clude personal property lying on the premises 
taken, but not affixed thereto and it is held in 
many cases that damages for injury to such per-
sonal property or the expense of removing it 
from the premises taken are not proper elements 
of compensation. * * *" 27 Am. Jur. 2nd 
Eminent Domain, § 293, Page 103, as cited in 
r State v. Woodham, 264 So. 2d 166 (Ala. 1972). 
The state submits that the testimony of Mr. Pack 
was not proper in the first place, however, the state also 
submits that the figures on the equipment also were in-
competent and only served to confuse the jury as indi-
cated by the verdict in excess of the testimony. There-
fore, this case must be revetted and remanded to the 
lower court with instruction that personalty is not a part 
of this action and that fixtures are properly valued only 
as they enhance the value of the improvements. To 
affirm an award solely for personal property as was al-
lowed by the lower court in this action clearly is contrary 
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to law, is against the policy of the statutes on Eminent 
Domain and would be a highly dangerous and confused 
precedent for future condemnation cases, 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
STATE'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE IN-
COMPETENT TESTIMONY OF DEFEN-
DANT'S WITNESS. 
After the direct examination of Mr. Saxton, the 
State moved to strike Mr. Saxton's testimony (T. 88). 
The motion was again renewed out of the presence of 
the jury (T. 117). The motion was denied by the court. 
While striking the entire testimony of the witness 
is a severe course of action, the state submits that it is 
proper where most, if not all, of what the witness has 
testified to is found to be incompetent or without foun-
dation. 
The qualification of an expert witness is to 
be determined by the trial judge, and if he de-
termines that a witness by reason of training 
and experience can assist the jury by giving an 
opinion on the matter properly before the court, 
we on appeal should not hold that testimony 
should be stricken unless such palpable ignorance 
of the subject matter is manifested by the wit-
ness as to indicate an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial judge in allowing the witness 
to express an opinion in the first place or in re-
fusing to grant a motion to strike after it is 
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given. State Road Commission v. Silliman, 448 
R 2d 347, 22 Utah 2d 33. 
Mr. Saxton's testimony was objectionable and should 
have been stricken as a matter of law for the following 
reasons; Mr. Saxton didn't define fair market value or 
highest and best use. He relied on incompetent sales 
to the Road Commission (T. 92), sales he did not know 
the terms of (T. 144), and inter-family conveyances (T. 
138, 145) in order to establish his opinion of value. His 
dates of valuation are entirely related to 1973, that is, 
August 1, 1973 for the lease (T. 72) and September 1, 
1973 for the building (T. 97), rather than the correct 
date in December of 1971. His valuation of the lease is 
based upon the entire property whereas only one-fourth 
of the property was actually leased and he in effect ad-
mitted that a difference in the amount of property would 
make a difference in his opinion (T. 119). 
Most glaring of all, however, was Mr. Sax ton's mis-
taken willingness to determine fair market value of the 
property and then add thereto his estimate of the lease 
value for land and building which almost doubled the 
value of the subject property from $90,000 to $156,000 
(T. 109, 110). This testimony, when taken into consid-
eration with the other defendant's witnesses at trial al-
lowed the jury to speculate and to potentially award the 
value of the lease both to Mr. Brown as well as to de-
fendant Southland Corporation. 
The state submits that when Mr. Saxton's testimony 
is so replete with mistaken assumptions, incorrect meth-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
ods and obviously erroneous conclusions, then, in this 
particular case it demonstrates that type of ignorance 
which under the law justifies a motion to strike, 
CONCLUSION 
The most serious problem complained of in this 
appeal is that evidence of the value of the leasehold in-
terest was placed before the jury irrespective of its con-
nection with the value of the total tract of the subject 
property as well as over and above the fair market value 
of the property. Moreover the instructions of the court 
confused the jury until they were in effect compelled to 
establish just compensation by adding the full value of 
the property together with the present value of the lease. 
Mr. Saxton clearly added the value of the lease over 
and above the market value of the subject property. Thus 
in his opinion, he compensated the owner for the entire 
loss of the lease. The testimony of Mr. Pack and Mr. 
Weber taken together clearly were intended to establish 
a separate value (or values) for the lease over and above 
any amount awarded to the land owner. Thus, in their 
opinion, they asked for compensation to Southland Cor-
poration (7-11) for the entire value of the lease separate 
from any value of the property itself. 
To allow all this testimony at the trial to determine 
fair market value and just compensation is erroneous 
and confusing to the jury as to just what interests to 
compensate and how those interests relate to the total 
value of the property. The result was that the jury in 
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effect was asked to pay twice for the value of the lease 
over and above the value of the taking and damages and 
actually did award severance damage clearly in excess of 
that testified to by any witness. 
Moreover, the court had absolutely no legal basis 
for allowing evidence of personal property before the jury, 
much less for instructing the jury that they could find 
damage to personal property and then in effect requiring 
the jury to fill in the supplemental verdict form. While 
the court may not agree with the law, or even like the 
law it should at least attempt to follow the law. 
For the reasons set forth in this brief the state sub-
mits that the evidence, instructions and methods of ap-
praisal allowed at trial were in error, that to allow each 
interest to be compensated separate and apart from and 
over and above the market value of the property is wrong. 
Therefore, the state respectfully requests that the ver-
dict be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court 
with appropriate instructions to arrive at the true and 
correct award of just compensation in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN s. MCALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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